Any rational system of thought forms itself by its logical operations that relate things and the things themselves about which it reasons. Thus, a whole number system by reason establishes relationships of part and whole and ordered differences among the elements of thought, numbers. Geometrical reasoning takes different elements of thoughts and organizes a logical system among geometric elements.
Since these mental operations and elements of thought display themselves in a person's reasoning, we can attempt to reveal the nature of the person's system of thought. When mathematicians or physicists attempt to formally axiomitize a system, the are attempting to define the elements and rational transformations that allows thought to move around the system by establishing relationships among the elements such that the operational logic can be shown to work rationally, that is, that the system is non-contradictory by their demonstration.
A system of reasoning about morality or an aspect of political economy or any other system of reasoning remains susceptible to an effort to uncover its axiomatic basis. We can investigate the elements and reasoning the system appears to be using and determine whether these are rational and non-contradictory.
Of course, there are many systems of reasoning so that a simple system can be shown to be contradictory by the use of a more powerful system. None-the-less, an essential tool of investigation is to begin with an attempt to describe the elements and operational logic that composes a system. This deconstruction or dissembling of a system makes clear without distortion exactly how the system works, that is, it is an axiomatization of the system such as to reveal its composition and structure.
For example, here is de Jasay at work attempting to analyze the idea of the state in political economy.
Anthony de Jasay: "Absent a state, why would I ever keep an agreement I had made with you to do something for you in the future, in return for your present payment? A familiar argument from game theory shows that in many circumstances, defection pays. Only an external agency of coercion, the state, can enable a system of social cooperation to get off the ground."
He is pointing out a particular meaning of "agreements" refers to self-interest such that there is nothing in agreements to compel cooperation except personal gains.
"Against this popular view, Mr. de Jasay deploys an ingenious argument. If we cannot trust rational individuals to keep their agreements, why should we trust the state to exercise its job of enforcement as rational actors intend? The agents of the state are themselves self-interested actors, no more altruistic than anyone else."
"It is crucial to the understanding of the putative resolution of the dilemma of contract [by an external agent]." Mr. de Jasay writes, "that while an enforcing agent can, under certain conditions, enable the parties to pass from n-person non-cooperative to (conflictually) cooperative games by entering into binding commitments, the interaction between the agent and either party remains a two-person non-cooperative game. Nothing proves the possibility of a binding contract between the parties and enforcing agent; there is no meta-agent that could, and would, enforce this contract" (pp. 18-19).
Our challenge is to axiomitize de Jasay by identifying the concepts and their definitions he is using and then uncovering his reasoning, that its, the relationships he establishes among concepts. We would want to unpackaghe his notion of cooperation or agreements since he sees no compelling reason for their conservation except personal altruism or gain.
The only point I am making at this point i to uggest that until we have the tools to analyze a form of thought, we cannot investigate its development or compare it to other forms. If we leap to a premature analysis then we end up using our form of thought to impute and distort the thinking of others that we are analyzing. Another way to put this is to insist on an objective description of a system of though before proceeding to critical discussions. And that investigation and axiomatizing requires the use of precise analytic tools any which tghe difficult investigation can be successfully conducted. Otherwise, we cannot reach agreements, and we sind up throwing assertions at each other.
Friday, October 24, 2008
The rationality of objects of thought: e.g., the "common good"
The representation of an object of thought can be either an initial referrant not yet structured such that it is not yet coherent due to its lack of a logic of organization of its meaning, or it can be conceptualized such that its logic of organization composes its parts and whole in logical relationships and allows differences among occurrences to be ordered. Thus, we can refer to undeveloped notions as "global" and those that have been conceptually organized as "analytic."
The idea of the "common good" is one such referrant that remains a global notion that belies the dependency its vague meaning has on the person using the notion. Thus, it is difficult to reach agreement on instances of the common good or to analyze the idea such as to produce a rational, stable definition. For example, Anthony de Jasay analyzed this irrationality of the common good.
Some notions retain their referential word after being conceptualized—the word weight as a referant is used both in its pre-conceptual from in young children's thinking as well as its rational meaning among adults. Other notions are discarded and replaced with a different referential word. Weight is a specific idea that retains its referent word through developmental change from pre-conceptual to conceptual (although interestingly children tend to think about weight in terms of the more general referent of bigness which they discard after finally conceptualizing weight).
On the other hand, global notions such as common good or achievement refer to generalities, not specifics, and do not seem to be retained as referents after conceptualization. In other words, conceptualization may not need the global notion as a starting basis for its inferences and choices.
The idea of the "common good" is one such referrant that remains a global notion that belies the dependency its vague meaning has on the person using the notion. Thus, it is difficult to reach agreement on instances of the common good or to analyze the idea such as to produce a rational, stable definition. For example, Anthony de Jasay analyzed this irrationality of the common good.
The rationality of politics: "A good deal, however, is left to be said about what is not to be done, and said, and why. Nine parts of practical politics is the making of non-unanimous decisions by some, that hurt others. Do we really want such decisions imposed as rational means to ends that are ultimately neither rational nor irrational, and must be posited by brazen assertion, mystical communion with the good, or occult value-comparisons between persons? Pareto-optimal outcomes offer a minimal morally legitimate space for a minimal state, and no more. Surely, it tells something about the ontology of politics that logic, morality, or both lend themselves so much better to condemning political action than to defending its legitimacy."
Some notions retain their referential word after being conceptualized—the word weight as a referant is used both in its pre-conceptual from in young children's thinking as well as its rational meaning among adults. Other notions are discarded and replaced with a different referential word. Weight is a specific idea that retains its referent word through developmental change from pre-conceptual to conceptual (although interestingly children tend to think about weight in terms of the more general referent of bigness which they discard after finally conceptualizing weight).
On the other hand, global notions such as common good or achievement refer to generalities, not specifics, and do not seem to be retained as referents after conceptualization. In other words, conceptualization may not need the global notion as a starting basis for its inferences and choices.
Thursday, January 17, 2008
Teaching and Parenting Programs—Two Recommendations
It is trite to point out that differences in parenting and teaching skills undoubta ly make a difference in the kind of kids we raise. Clearly some kids are irresponsible in their behaviors, some very responsible. What kind of a program should we use? There are many out there but from studying the literature we can abstract a few criteria to sort the programs to identify those that usefully combine more advanced explanations of development with corresponding developmental techniques. Two programs, for example, meet those criteria, "Parent (or Teacher) Effectiveness Training" and "Discipline Without Stress Teaching Model." Both are adapted to teaching as well as parenting.
The explanations and problem solving model of Thomas Gordon in his work, Parent Effectiveness Training still serves me today as a basis for discussions with my son. I would recommend its problem solving techniques to any parent or teacher as a foundation for learning how to promote children's development of responsible behavior. At the heart of parent and teacher effectiveness are the skills of active listening, the distinction between feelings/values and true problems with tangible consequences, the problem posing and problem solving process, and the crucial language that accompanies these skills.
Another current program I believe is tops in the field is Marvin Marshall's Discipline Without Stress, Punishments, or Rewards. It too is full of techniques for developing and involving children in their own self-management; it is an advanced program because it helps us understand differences among the parenting psychologies and understand why the control and punitive discipline approaches (that most parents use) don't work as well as why the approaches based on inviting and encouraging children to become more involved in being responsible for their own behavior works so well. In fact, by directly helping children understand the different levels of management of their behavior—from having the parent control them up to having them take responsibility—forms the heart of MM's program and techniques. It is well-suited to the classroom situation.
Here's the four levels of social and personal development that Marvin Marshall teaches. A key part is to not only to insure the child understands the four levels but then in each situation to have him choose which level he wants to use. The techniques build from there.
The four levels of social and personal development that Marvin Marshall teaches:
Teaching and parenting are consequentially of long term importance, and they involve at least a little theory of child development as well as some corresponding techniques. We should look for programs that work simultaneously with the child's point of view and the teacher’s own in tackling challenges—i.e., using problem solving processes rather than either controlling the child in an authoritarian manner that demands obedience or giving in to the child in a permissive manner that gives no guidance. The program should have some precise conceptual model explaining development. It should have a set of specific techniques, and the program should have a developmental component, that is, it should help us take account of levels of development in both children and among the programs themselves. Both the Gordon and Marshall programs recognize the developmental differences among children in the levels of assuming responsibility for their behaviors and somewhat to a degree among programs themselves although not necessarily by assigning them development levels.
The explanations and problem solving model of Thomas Gordon in his work, Parent Effectiveness Training still serves me today as a basis for discussions with my son. I would recommend its problem solving techniques to any parent or teacher as a foundation for learning how to promote children's development of responsible behavior. At the heart of parent and teacher effectiveness are the skills of active listening, the distinction between feelings/values and true problems with tangible consequences, the problem posing and problem solving process, and the crucial language that accompanies these skills.
Another current program I believe is tops in the field is Marvin Marshall's Discipline Without Stress, Punishments, or Rewards. It too is full of techniques for developing and involving children in their own self-management; it is an advanced program because it helps us understand differences among the parenting psychologies and understand why the control and punitive discipline approaches (that most parents use) don't work as well as why the approaches based on inviting and encouraging children to become more involved in being responsible for their own behavior works so well. In fact, by directly helping children understand the different levels of management of their behavior—from having the parent control them up to having them take responsibility—forms the heart of MM's program and techniques. It is well-suited to the classroom situation.
Here's the four levels of social and personal development that Marvin Marshall teaches. A key part is to not only to insure the child understands the four levels but then in each situation to have him choose which level he wants to use. The techniques build from there.
The four levels of social and personal development that Marvin Marshall teaches:
(D) Democracy—Internal motivation. Highest Level.
Develops self-discipline and displays responsibility.
Demonstrates initiative.
Democracy and responsibility are inseparable.
(The difference between levels C and D is in the motivation, not the behavior.)
(C) Cooperation/Conformity—External motivation levels.
Considerate
Complies with what is expected.
Conforms (includes conforming to peer pressure that may be irresponsible.)
(Only levels C and D are acceptable behaviors.)
(B) Bossing/Bullying
Bothers others. Bullies others.
Breaks laws and standards.
Must be bossed to behave.
(A) Anarchy (not to be confused with “anarchism”)
Absence of order. Aimless and chaotic.
Teaching and parenting are consequentially of long term importance, and they involve at least a little theory of child development as well as some corresponding techniques. We should look for programs that work simultaneously with the child's point of view and the teacher’s own in tackling challenges—i.e., using problem solving processes rather than either controlling the child in an authoritarian manner that demands obedience or giving in to the child in a permissive manner that gives no guidance. The program should have some precise conceptual model explaining development. It should have a set of specific techniques, and the program should have a developmental component, that is, it should help us take account of levels of development in both children and among the programs themselves. Both the Gordon and Marshall programs recognize the developmental differences among children in the levels of assuming responsibility for their behaviors and somewhat to a degree among programs themselves although not necessarily by assigning them development levels.
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