The rationality of objects of thought: e.g., the "common good"

The representation of an object of thought can be either an initial referrant not yet structured such that it is not yet coherent due to its lack of a logic of organization of its meaning, or it can be conceptualized such that its logic of organization composes its parts and whole in logical relationships and allows differences among occurrences to be ordered. Thus, we can refer to undeveloped notions as "global" and those that have been conceptually organized as "analytic."

The idea of the "common good" is one such referrant that remains a global notion that belies the dependency its vague meaning has on the person using the notion. Thus, it is difficult to reach agreement on instances of the common good or to analyze the idea such as to produce a rational, stable definition. For example, Anthony de Jasay analyzed this irrationality of the common good.

The rationality of politics: "A good deal, however, is left to be said about what is not to be done, and said, and why. Nine parts of practical politics is the making of non-unanimous decisions by some, that hurt others. Do we really want such decisions imposed as rational means to ends that are ultimately neither rational nor irrational, and must be posited by brazen assertion, mystical communion with the good, or occult value-comparisons between persons? Pareto-optimal outcomes offer a minimal morally legitimate space for a minimal state, and no more. Surely, it tells something about the ontology of politics that logic, morality, or both lend themselves so much better to condemning political action than to defending its legitimacy."

Some notions retain their referential word after being conceptualized—the word weight as a referant is used both in its pre-conceptual from in young children's thinking as well as its rational meaning among adults. Other notions are discarded and replaced with a different referential word. Weight is a specific idea that retains its referent word through developmental change from pre-conceptual to conceptual (although interestingly children tend to think about weight in terms of the more general referent of bigness which they discard after finally conceptualizing weight).

On the other hand, global notions such as common good or achievement refer to generalities, not specifics, and do not seem to be retained as referents after conceptualization. In other words, conceptualization may not need the global notion as a starting basis for its inferences and choices.